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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores and supports the increasing
institutional financing of, and equity investment in,
the operating businesses of real estate developers.
Increased illiquidity and regulation of traditional
real estate capital markets have forced developers to
seek interim operating and construction funds for new
business. This thesis examines the opportunities,
risks and returns on the portfolios of institutions who
fund or acquire established development companies in
relation to traditional, property specific,
acquisitions.
The investment in an established developer
requires the valuation of assets beyond the existing
portfolio to include: operating futures, management
skills, and corporate reputation. Finally, the thesis
creates a valuation model for developer oriented,
relationship based investments in localized
entrepreneurial real estate organizations.
Thesis Supervisor: Marc Louargand
Title: Lecturer in Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores and supports the argument for
institutional investors to augment their real estate
portfolio allocation needs through equity investments in
development companies. Corporate equity ownership and
financing structures may allow increased long term
portfolio returns with lower risk than traditional,
property specific investments. Ownership and control of
the production of real estate may offer additional
access to premium assets and market knowledge.
Public and private pension funds, insurance
companies and private trusts concerned with reasonable
portfolio returns or fiduciary management of their
investments gravitated toward real estate as an
acceptable asset class. Early research into returns and
volatility showed that real estate could be an
attractive addition to the institution's stock and bond
holdings. Consequently, institutional money managers
added real estate to their investment portfolios during
the late 1960's and early 1970's. Each real estate
capital investment was actually a business investment
dependent on successful leasing to commercial and
residential tenants. In the aggregate, the real estate
industry is composed
private firms that
and development m
of (a) real assets
offer investment,
anagement services;
; (b) public and
asset, property,
(c) and the
providers of investment capital. The real estate
service firms have not as yet been a critical part of
the investment. Institutional real estate investors
focused on real assets and property specific investments
to fulfill their real estate portfolio allocation
demands.
Preliminary forays into the world of real estate
investment consisted primarily of debt financing on real
assets with a guaranteed return on simple mortgage
loans. High quality, well located trophy properties
were the investments of choice. As the knowledge and
skill level of institutional real estate managers
increased, complicated financial structures with
qualities of both debt and equity emerged. These
investments were often backed by second tier, suburban,
commercial and industrial properties. During this
period of investment evolution and growth, institutional
investors experienced substantial success with the real
estate allocation of their overall portfolios.
That success, however, may be increasingly difficult
to duplicate on a long term, risk adjusted basis during
the real estate environment of the 1990's. The
explosive growth of both real estate values and floor
space inventory in the United States ended in 1989.
Record numbers of real estate company bankruptcies
followed a plunge in the capital market's willingness to
finance the operation and construction of real estate.
Nevertheless, strong investment potential may still
be available, to institutional investors willing to
extend real estate investment into the means of
production. Ownership, funding, and control of high
caliber development companies may satisfy institutional
demands for sustained high returns with low risk.
Difficulties in the real estate industry may necessitate
the long term financing of development companies to
sustain the production of quality investments. The
demarcation between investor and seller may continue to
dissolve. To further this trend, institutional
investors should explore equity ownership in development
companies as a vehicle for continued investment in real
estate.
CHAPTER 2
THE REAL ESTATE MARKETPLACE
THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
The fiduciary acceptability of real estate
investment as an asset class has evolved tremendously
from its inception. Real estate investment by
institutions (pension funds and fiduciary institutions)
began in the early 1970's. Previous pension fund
sponsors worried about the legality and acceptability of
investing in real estate during until the early 1980's.
As fiduciary investor's knowledge has increased, the
acceptability of real estate has grown accordingly. In
comparison, responsible bond and equity investment
strategies has evolved to allow investments with, and
in, experienced mutual fund managers. The augmentation
of real estate portfolios with direct ownership of
eminent developers may follow this same evolution.
Portfolio managers first explored simple debt and
equity investment structures. Investors then financed
trusts, commingled funds, joint ventures, and finally
direct investments. Yet institutions have not been
thoroughly satisfied with their investment structures.
During the evolution, investors have continuously
searched for better method of placing their money in
real estate.
By 1990, contributions to pension funds grew over
100% from 1985 levels. During this time, the average of
investment funds for real estate also increased to a 10%
allocation percentage. The implicit demand for real
estate grew from this 10% to over $268 billion by 1988.2
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The fund's growth spurred investments at
increasingly lower returns as "large amounts of money
chased fewer quality projects.,3 The respected
Russell-NCREIF index tract the decline in total real
estate returns over the past decade.4
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The index also showed declines in 1990 returns
divided by property type. 5
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For the first time in its inception in 1978, real estate
returns of the Russell-NCREIF Index (6%) were lower than
the benchmark U.S. T-Bill (8.2%).6 The decline in real
estate returns came through many different financial
structures of institutional real estate investment.
They included:
INSTITUTIONAL REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT EVOLUTION
DEBT
EQUITY
REITS
COMMINGLED FUNDS
JOINT VENTURES
DIRECT INVESTMENT
DEBT
Traditional debt financing has been an acceptable
financial structure from the inception of fiduciary real
estate investing. Institutions invested in existing,
successful, property and avoided development, leasing,
and future valuation risk. The portfolio returns were
quantifiable for the life of the investment.
Development and construction loans were secured by the
property and personal guarantees from the principals.
During periods of strong growth in the late 1970's
and early 1980's, many developers followed the "Wild cat
approach to real estate development." The preferred
"spec, spec" development projects financed at high risk
with minimal equity from the company. The buildings
were often started without any sales or leases in place.
Institutional lenders found, however, their debt
margins and returns to be too low for their risk levels.
An experienced developer commented, "Today the real
estate entrepreneur finds that substantial equity is
required to get a loan. Most simply, the traditional
mortgage lenders are no longer willing to make money
available on the favorable terms that they have in the
past; the rates are higher and the ratios of loans are
lower. Straight debt has fallen out of favor with
lenders. They want more, often participation in the
equity return."9
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EQUITY
Lenders realized that their real estate debt returns
were often lackluster when compared to the developer's
leveraged equity returns. A substantial rise in real
estate values during the early 1980's accentuated the
discrepancy between debt and equity. Institutional
lenders developed hybrid structures including
convertible mortgages and equity participations to
capture appreciation increases in their real estate.
Investors not willing to lend searched, often without
success, for quality equity.
Understandably, developers did not like to sell
successful projects with unrealized appreciation . An
institutional investor lamented the problem, "A year
ago, a developer would hardly deign to talk to you about
selling a building at a price that was less than
projected future rents capitalized at 8 %." 10 But
quality equity may eventually become less expensive.
The investor continued, "That same developer is now
hustling around trying to sell at a price that is
getting close to what he could get for a foreclosure
auction. This should allow for easier and more
profitable equity investment because "the developer's
conversion from euphoria to gloom is probably
unwarranted."11  Clearly, asset based equity should be
attractive over the near term.
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS
As one form of investment in equity real estate,
Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITS) became popular
during the mid 1970's. REIT returns were negatively
correlated with unleveraged equity real estate
returns, highly correlated with common stock and, to a
lesser degree, correlated with bonds. A broad index of
equity real estate returns does little statistically to
explain REIT share performance.12 REITs underperformed
the Frank Russell Company Index (FRC) and the S & P 500
Index over their 15 year lifespan.1 3
REIT returns improved somewhat during the late
1980's. The repeal of tax incentives in 1986 has
renewed interest in REITs because of their interest in
maximizing their cash flow income. 14 However, real
estate investment managers felt detached from the
substance of the underlying asset pools. REIT's
lackluster returns and movement with publicly traded
equities have discouraged further institutional
investment.
COMMINGLED FUNDS
A further extension of real estate investment
structures was developed through commingled investment
funds. The funds were sponsored by a fiduciary advisor
who provided real estate expertise. Institutions
invested with small amounts of money or with small
staffs. An industry critic 15 commented in 1982 that
"The introduction of the pooled fund arrangement in 1970
enabled pension funds to diversify into real estate
without having to become real estate "experts." The
commingled fund arrangement have enabled both industries
to meet without either parties having to become an
"expert" in the other's affairs. More importantly,
however, these now pooled fund arrangements offer
pension funds a way of entering real estate investments
with a greater feeling of security. There has not been
a real appreciation of the financial responsibilities
and investment criteria of investors and advisors. The
names of these substantial financial institutions stand
as a sort of protection from the vicissitudes of a
relatively "new" investment arena for many pension
funds."
As the performance of fund managers and the skills of
investment managers improved, communication and
understanding has dramatically improved. However, some
knowledgeable institutions desired greater contact with
the properties. Most wanted to optimize their portfolio
diversification through property types. Eventually,
many real estate fund investors gravitated toward
discretionary accounts with commingled advisors to
increase control over their investments.
JOINT VENTURES
To further increase investment control, institutions
also entered joint ventures. Aggressive pension fund
advisory companies such as Copley Real Estate Advisors
advocated joint ventures with strong regional
developers. Progressive advisors and sophisticated fund
managers joined forces with reputable developers on
promising projects. Relationships were established and
repeated when successful. The institutions thereby
gained access to the developer's strategic position and
high returns.16 The financial structure promoted
cooperation between developer and investor. Copley
believed these relationship based investments were
promising and increased returns over commingled funds
with similar or lessened risk.
DIRECT INVESTMENT
The next step in the evolution of real estate
investment was direct investment, without developers or
advisors as partners. Throughout the evolution,
investors have been conceptually and legally distinct
from developers. As late as 1978, one pension fund
advisor commented, "To the best of my knowledge, there
are no U.S. pension funds with in-house staffs doing
development work for their own accounts."1 7 But the
transformation of investor types was swift. "A trend
developed for funds to become involved early on in the
development process. The decade of the 1980's brought
"more sophisticated people into pension fund
management." By 1990, many institutions had separate
real estate departments locating and investing in
projects. These departments often surpassed local
developers in their own markets.
Progressive fund sponsors realized that, "A pension
15
plan that wants a better return than commingled funds
offer should set up its own in-house real estate
program. If done right, the plan will make more money
on its holdings than a similar portfolio run by an
investment advisor or a commingled fund." 9 Others
concurred, "A pension fund that proceeded on its own
would be able to obtain higher returns than pooled
equity funds after administrative expenses are paid."20
Some pension funds invested directly because it was
"more economical to hire their own internal people. But
staffs were kept lean in a pension fund to show good
returns. The funds then ended up hiring external
expertise anyway."22 The outside advisory firm's
management and acquisition fees were quite high.
As pension funds began to invest directly, the
market became very competitive for good projects. One
industry observer noted, "private and commingled funds
bid against one another for the best investments to the
point that the highest quality projects returns were
below the risks associated with real estate."21
There was no consensus among pension fund managers.
Some felt the cost of maintaining a highly skilled
investment management staff was significant and ought to
be included in evaluating the expected returns of these
real estate investment opportunities.23 Furthermore, it
is uncertain that in-house development personnel have
access to the strategic advantages of community based
entrepreneurs and building type experts.
ADVISORS
Real estate service firms sprang up as fiduciary
advisors to satisfy the increase in institutional real
estate investment. They were retained for a variety of
transactions. Advisory personnel had real estate or
finance experience and sold their services and
investments to individual or combined real estate funds.
One real estate fund manager commented, "The trustees'
desire to shield themselves from the possibly perverse
consequences of real estate investing is one of the main
reasons these advisory firms exist. They promise
protection. Developers and other real estate people who
have talked with pension funds about possible joint
ventures and financing know that the one thing that
inevitably kills any deal is that the pension officer
refuses to accept the responsibility for making the
deal. They want a fiduciary to approve it." 24
Advisory firms provided services beyond a fiduciary
double check. These firms acted as brokers, managers,
strategists, as well as councilors - for a fee.
Advisors ran the daily investment and property
management tasks and provided important access to
sophisticated real estate developers. But the advisors
often recommended the same project to different
investors, or screened projects from certain buyers.
They had strong leverage because "there was a lot of
money chasing a few high quality properties."25
Simultaneously, the advisors taught their clients
the fine points of real estate deal making on each
successive investment. Eventually, the pension fund
manager's increased skill level prompted them to
question their advisor's recommendations.
Each of the investment vehicles was selected for
different risk and return targets by managers with
varying aversions to risk. No single structure met the
pension fund's portfolio allocation needs. As such, the
evolution of investment vehicles has been driven by the
shortcomings of previous designs. In general, the
institutional real estate investor has developed
valuable skill and knowledge. As knowledge increases,
investors pursue ever more complicated structures,
thereby encroaching into the developer's arena. As the
growth of the 1980's subsides, institutions will be hard
pressed to find high quality, successful, real estate.
The competition for real estate will increase.
THE REAL ESTATE ENVIRONMENT
The business of real estate development and finance
grew at a moderate pace during the 1980's. Absorption
of newly created space was strong in most markets.
Effective rents and sale prices increased and real
estate investment capital was plentiful. Real estate
developers were also plentiful and offered diverse
products with homogeneous returns. Institutional real
estate funds generally pursued conservative investment
structures. A few aggressive investors had an
increasing appetite for equity participation and
development deals. However, the end of the decade
foreshadowed a different real estate environment.
The development business had radically deteriorated.2 6
"Nothing is more humbling to a developer of the
1980's than to be a developer in the 1990's.
1990 began with most regional United States markets
of all property categories in over supply. Vacancy
rates increased to record levels in all major office,
commercial, industrial, and residential sectors.27 real
estate developers were not optimistic about their future
business. REAL ESTATE 1990
COMPARED WITH 1989
BEAR MARKET FOR FIRM
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The overbuilt markets put pressure on rents and
capitalized sale values of real estate equity.
Additional recessionary pressure on the critical
Standard Industry Category (S.I.C.) of Fire, Insurance,
and Real Estate lessened those industry's office space
needs. The consolidation of the service sector
increased leasing concessions and lowered releasing face
rents, further decreasing existing asset values. 28
CAPITAL MARKETS
The demand for space was not helped by tightened
capital markets. Increased regulatory control in the
savings and loan and commercial banking industries over
the deregulated environment of the 1980's precipitated a
national credit squeeze. In July of 1990, the Galbreath
Company, a prominent national developer, reflected, "The
banks and savings and loans are basically out of the
market" for construction loans. We are looking to
pension funds, overseas investors and other sources of
financing. As a result, there isn't a lot of new
building." 29
The tightened lending environment heightened the
need for developer equity. Galbreath continued, "We
have one suburban project that's a build to suit
situation. The tenants are already lined up. But the
lenders still want equity from us. That and other
demands have prevented an agreement on financing, and
the company hasn't started building yet. Our primary
thrust has been to build where we have equity in the
20
project. But with situations more difficult to finance,
the company will do more contract building."30
The demand for additional equity and operating
capital came during an environment of difficult tax
policy. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 removed the tax
shelter impetus to help raise real estate equity through
syndications. This eroded the equity capital base
available for real estate investment because of lowered
yields. Equity capital raised through syndications
dropped to one tenth of the level raised prior to tax
reform.31 In summary, "Two of the major sources of
capital dried up, the banks and the syndicators. The
capital markets were moving in unsettling directions."32
LIQUIDITY
The turbulent capital markets caused severe
operating problems for developers. Development firms
traditionally owned property and operated the company
with high leverage. Most aggressive developers had only
10-15% of their own equity in each project, providing
large returns through positive leverage. Cash flow from
completed projects covered corporate overhead,
feasibility, architectural and legal expenses for new
projects. Consequently, small cash flow shortfalls
caused severe liquidity problems for thinly capitalized
organizations. A developer commented, "We used to say,
'The more debt the better.', But those days are over in
the development business. Now 'Equity will rule.' You
need equity to ride out the tough times."33
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During down periods, a herd mentality developed in
the entrepreneurial real estate community. To avoid
looking bad, the image conscious developers waited until
the onset of problems to sell their property. They
feared signaling financial trouble to creditors and
competitors. This mentality often impeded sales of
assets during growth periods to generate cash flow.
When sales could no longer be delayed, a wave of sellers
often swamped the market. Few buyers were interested
when the development community reacted to a cash flow
crisis. By 1990, "The pendulum was hurtling beyond
depression and into panic."34 "There were at least two
reasons for their flight to panic. First, the real
estate market has, or at least appears to have,
stagnated. Second, very few deals are being made." 35
There was little the real estate community could do
to change the disconcerting aura. Developers and
investors alike realized the credit crunch of 1990 may
have been a short lived moment in terms of a pension's
portfolio life.36 Ironically, "Those who understood
potential long term values were either unable to finance
acquisitions or waited for prices to bottom."37
Long time industry analysts commented, "Despite the
sense of doom, the truth is that the real estate
business is never as good or as bad as people say.
Living in the real estate community is like spending
your summer vacation in a ward for manic depressives,
Yesterday, nothing could go wrong; and, today, nothing
22
can go right. There's no middle ground."38
Surprisingly, some developers did not have liquidity
problems. Large developers like JMB Institutional
Realty of Chicago continued to thrive in the
marketplace. one institutional investment partner said,
"JMB is very well capitalized and remains in a very
solid position."39 The company's continued health in a
turbulent real estate environment is due in large part
to its access to institutional funds, which reduces its
dependence on short term borrowed funds. 40
The real estate marketplace of 1990 is difficult for
institutions and developers alike. Both parties have
crisis they urgently want to solve.
Institutions have money to invest in real estate and
they have grown familiar with developers, yet quality
investments are scarce. They desire premium assets and
recognize they need talented management to find and run
them.
Developers want to survive. Severe overbuilding and
liquidity problems have forced many to reconsider their
place in the industry. They need to sell their property
and their expertise. They need to sell to institutions.
23
CHAPTER 3
THE DEVELOPER INVESTMENT SCENARIOS
THE SOLUTION
Institutional equity investment in real estate
development companies provides a practical solution for
the needs of both portfolio managers and developers.
Developers get operating capital to see them through the
difficult development climate and to plan for future
projects. Portfolios secure real estate class
investments of the highest caliber. Yet, institutions
may be reluctant to acquire these means of production in
the real estate industry. The benefits to owner and
investor alike should outweigh the difficulties of
creating the relationship. Strong institutional
leverage during the depressed market era may allow the
structuring of investments to dampen investor's
historical concerns.
Three distinct vehicles for equity and equity-like
investments are available to pension funds. Investments
include publicly traded stock, privately held equity and
hybrid equity or corporate financing. Each financial
structure has a number of related substructures. The
various structures have characteristics suitable for
strategic, investment and development needs.
PUBLIC EQUITY e PRIVATE EQUITY e HYBRID EQUITY
Real Estate Companies Real Estate Companies Loan on Portfolio
Substantial Holdings Income Property Loan on Cash Flow
REITS Direct Investment Preferred Stock
(A) PUBLICLY TRADED EQUITY
A major category of equity contains publicly traded
stock. Publicly held stock includes development
companies and companies with substantial real estate
holdings that trade on a major stock exchange. Stock
analysis and acquisition through traditional equity
markets is similar to any public equity acquisition.
The control of the real estate only comes through
control of the majority of shares outstanding or through
enough stock to obtain influential seats on the board of
directors. These acquisitions may be realized by
solicited or unsolicited stock offers at or above market
price. Purchase of public stock may be directly from
the company or through brokerage houses.
DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES
The first type of publicly traded equity contains
development companies. There are only a few pure real
estate companies with publicly traded stock of
substantial size. of these, many firms specialize in
residential construction or building materials and may
be unfamiliar to the institutional real estate investor.
A number of hotel operating companies have in-house
development divisions to supply product for their own
account. Perini Investment Properties is one of the few
examples with commercial, hotel, and residential
expertise. 41
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SUBSTANTIAL REAL ESTATE
The second type of publicly traded equity includes
corporations with substantial real estate holdings.
Companies with real estate holdings may be attractive
for equity investment for either their development
divisions or in their miscellaneous holdings. Large
utilities such as railroads, power utilities, mining,
transportation and agriculture may have promising
holdings. Large office users have vast supplies of
owner occupied space. Other corporations may recognize
value in their office buildings or industrial factories
as redevelopment opportunities.
In fact, corporate real estate holdings dwarf
institutional holdings in comparison. An example of a
company with substantial real estate is the Sante Fe
Pacific Railroad. A large pension fund commented, "The
California Public Employees Retirement Systems' purchase
of a 20 percent stake in Sante Fe Pacific Realty Corp.
on Dec. 29,(1989) closed a year that saw pension funds
taking larger and more unusual deals to meet their real
estate allocation targets. It is the first time that
the pension fund has asked for, and received, seats on
the board of directors."42
The investment was well received by the real estate
community. "It's one of the most creative investment
deals a pension fund has ever been involved with," noted
William Ramseyer, executive vice president with JMB
Institutional Realty Corp. CalPERS has purchased common
26
stock, at a discount, and is now considering taking the
developer private."4 3 Clearly, there was significant
opportunity to explore investments in corporate real
estate holdings.
REITS
A third, and familiar structure for public real
estate holdings are Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs). REITs that trade on major exchanges may be
acquired for long term hold or taken private and
reorganized. Most REIT portfolio holdings and
development intentions have been well defined in the
trust offering. REITs have specialized in many property
types and development scenarios.44
Though somewhat out of favor, REITs may be a credible
alternative for the smaller investor. Many REITs such
as Federal Realty employ high quality management to
oversee high quality assets. Direct control, however,
may not be obtainable due to frequent takeover defenses
written into the trust offerings.
(B) PRIVATE EQUITY
Private company equity owners are the second major
category of developer investment. This type of equity
involves development companies that are closely held,
other thinly traded corporations and limited
partnerships. Analysis and acquisition of each company
may be peculiar to each firm. The holder of private
equity must either be ready to sell their interest or be
27
convinced to sell with the lure of a high price. The
majority of entrepreneurial real estate developers will
fit into this category.
DEVELOPMENT COMPANIES
The first and most important subcategory of private
equity include development companies. Traditional
development companies that specialize in specific
markets or product types may part with their equity
holdings.
One exemplary sale to JMB Institutional Realty was
the Cadillac Fairview portfolio, which was the largest
developer in Canada. "JMB paid about $2 billion for
Toronto developer Cadillac Fairview in 1987. JMB also
purchased another developer when they paid $920 million
in 1988 for Amfac Inc. of Hawaii. Ownership of the
developers also fit well with their ownership of public
companies. JMB was general partner in the limited
partnership under which the California Public Employees
Retirement System last year paid $398 million for a 20%
stake in Sante Fe Pacific Corp's real estate
holdings."45 Conclusively, some of the largest and most
respected investors are beginning to look toward
development companies to satisfy their real estate
demands.
INCOME PROPERTY HOLDINGS
Income property holdings are a second subcategory of
private equity. Small corporations and families hold
equity and manage substantial quantities of private
28
income property. Institutions may approach income
property holders who want to sell their holdings after
life changes or to raise capital.46
Examples include the syndication of Rockefeller
Center by the Rockefeller family. Numerous other
families may hold strategically valuable real estate
suitable for institutional acquisition.
DIRECT INVESTMENT
The third subcategory of private equity investment
includes direct institutional investment. Investment
managers may decide to create a development company to
fill a demand that is not being met. In this strategy
the institution will not, however, be able to obtain the
strategic benefit and cost savings associated with the
purchase of an existing company.
An analyst commented, "From the pension fund
viewpoint, the only real reason to develop is that at
times it is cheaper to build a building than to buy an
existing one. Some development people will have no
choice but to work for pension funds. Several large
foreign pension funds have already done this
successfully."47
(C) HYBRID CORPORATE FINANCING
The third major category of developer investments
includes hybrid corporate financing. Hybrids include
many combinations of convertible mortgages, preferred
stock and controlling loan agreements. Control of a
29
developer may be gained through hybrid debt at favorable
terms if the developer has cash flow difficulties.
Hybrid structures may arise from the unsuitability or
unwillingness of a developer to part with their equity
portfolio. Corporate financing may also allow for
investment in the developer's current and future real
estate projects.
Developers with famous names got most of the debt
financing. The European funds were interested in
relationship based financing and equity sharing for
individual projects in individual markets. The Japanese
wanted to secure companies in broad markets and product
types. When the Japanese become a stock holder in
company, the developer had to enter into a long term non
compete clause. The hybrid financed developer then had
little flexibility to deal with anyone else for
financing or new projects.48
LOAN TO DEVELOPER SECURED BY PORTFOLIO EQUITY
An investor can gain access to a developer by
capitalizing the company with an operating loan. The
security may be equity on existing or future projects.
The ability to access portfolio equity may be
negotiable. The extent of negotiability would depend
upon the financial health of the developer.
Congress Group ventures was an example of medium
tier entrepreneurial developer that secured corporate
financing. organized as a Subchapter S corporation,
they developed 5 million square feet of commercial space
30
in New England and were financially sound. The owner
wanted to protect the asset base that he had built up
but still raise cash. He gave collateral only on his
future projects. He said, "If you have an earnings drop
they come and take your buildings, just like that. I've
worked too hard to give away everything I have built up.
When they convert your property you have a phantom tax
gain and no cash flow or project tax shelter to cover
the bill. They are only secured by the development
projects.49
LOAN TO DEVELOPER SECURED BY FUTURE CASH FLOWS
Loans secured by future cash flows could also be
used to control a developer. The secured amount of
investment funds is significantly smaller than loans
secured by assets but could have higher returns.
A lender commented, "The only problem is that the
pension fund has lost control of the property. The
developer is legally the owner. When disputes arise
over how the property should be managed or when it
should be sold, the pension fund has no real say. The
developer's decisions rule. Trading off control of the
property for a few extra points of return is a poor
strategy in a development deal unless the fund totally
trusts its partner, an unlikely occurrence."50
Yet, these loans could be successfully combined with
other financing vehicles. For example, "JMB loaned the
developer $75 million in addition to the $400 million
paid for the 20% equity stake. That loan could be paid
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back in the form of an even greater equity interest.'51
PREFERRED STOCK AND ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURES
A corporate type of financing vehicle may be more
prevalent in real estate debt and equity areas in the
future. Hybrid debt options were being offered by
pension advisors like Aldrich Eastman & Waltch.52 These
structures could be almost anything. For example, "a
preferred stock or subordinated debenture combined with
equity warrants. The investor would put up money and,
unlike a project financing, the capital would not be
taken out to go into the developer's pocket. The money
would stay in the company. It would be used as working
capital, to expand the developer's business and to take
advantage of other opportunities. This obviously
increases liquidity, and from the developer's point of
view, institutionalizes the borrowing capacity."52
The company can remain private and avoid
registration/disclosure requirements associated with a
public offering. Further, it may not be a taxable event
for the developer, hence there is no tax on sale, which
may be very important. Finally, a well respected
developer, such as the Macomber Company 53, may be able
to retain substantial control over the operation of its
business.54
In a participating mortgage the fund passes some
significant tax benefits to the developer. The
developer owns the property and can claim all the
construction write offs. The developer can also deduct
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the "mortgage payments" to the pension fund "lender." 55
Instead of paying shares of income to a part owner, the
project may make deductible interest payments.5 6
The flexible frame work of equity investments in
real estate development companies may meet the needs of
both investor and seller. The array of structuring
vehicles may tailor the investment to particular
investment characteristics.57 Advantages should be
realized by the equity investments. Institutions will
find quality, long-term real estate and developers will
find short term liquidity with long term profitability.
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CHAPTER 4
THE ADVANTAGES OF EQUITY OWNERSHIP
Numerous economic and strategic benefits will be
gained by institutional investments in corporate real
estate, equity-like vehicles. Enhanced portfolio
diversification, risk evaluation, and fiduciary
management will provide increased real returns with
lowered systematic risk.
ADVANTAGES OF OWNERSHIP
e DIVERSIFICATION
e PREMIUM PROPERTIES
" SECURED STREAM OF PROJECTS
" RISK EVALUATION
" CONTROL
e ACCESS TO INFORMATION
" ACCESS TO MANAGEMENT
e QUALITY
" EFFICIENCY
DIVERSIFICATION
Investment managers may be concerned with the impact
of real estate's on their entire portfolio. Real estate
funds gain enhanced portfolio diversification through
access to premium properties, to future projects and to
corporate profits. The California Public Employees
Retirement System purchase of Sante Fe Realty stock is
an example of this portfolio diversification. The
investment fund stated, "Calpers was eager for the Sante
Fe deal because its portfolio melded perfectly into the
Calpers portfolio, which was under weighted in
California."58 Consequently, fund managers can
efficiently search for companies that specialize in
market niches and regions where their portfolios are
weak.
In comparing real estate risk to the stock market, a
portfolio manager said, "it is easier to diversify away
unsystematic risk in real estate than in almost any of
the S&P industry groupings. This creates the potential
for risk reduction through diversification within the
real estate portfolio."5 9 Investment in a real estate
developer should also behave contracyclicly to the
common stock market to provide further diversification
benefits.60
PREMIUM PROPERTY ACCESS
Large real estate development companies who build for
their account traditionally own substantial leveraged
equity in their portfolios. In fact, many corporate
mission statements describe their intent to keep the
very best property as part of their "long term
commitment to quality."61 Many developers intended to
hold their best performing assets for as long as they
are in business and sell off their marginal performers.
This makes sense for developers. Traditional
refinancing arrangements permits owners to realize
appreciation of their buildings in a nontaxable
transaction.
35
On the other hand, as capital and real estate
markets become tight and builders search for liquidity,
these sacrosanct assets may become available. A pension
fund advisor echoed this point, "Pension funds are
finding it increasingly difficult to fulfill their real
estate allocations. And with developers holding on to
their best performing properties, buying a piece of a
developer may be the only way to get the quality assets.
At most, the astute real investors will be able to
purchase the developer's quality holdings. At least,
the investor will be able to collateralize hybrid
investments with assets of the highest order.
SECURED STREAM OF PROJECTS
The institutional investor may also be able to
secure future access to these quality assets. The
Calpers fund stated, "One reason the fund invested in a
developer is it needs a steady stream of prime real
estate projects."62
The pricing of the developer equity investment will,
in effect, contain a call option on the products created
during the next building cycle. Fund managers can
purchase projects ahead of time at wholesale prices for
the fund's portfolio.63 Advisors concurred that
ownership of a developer may be seen as "A call option
on the future product offerings." 64  "Institutions may
secure projects by buying at wholesale instead of
retail."65 Another advisor concurred, "One of the most
interesting aspects of this type of transaction is the
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ability to be more on the developer's side of the deal.
If the investor capitalizes the developer they are in
effect, participating on a wholesale basis. This should
realize the investor substantial economic benefits."66
If the fund buys the property, the investment
managers would have exercised their option. Otherwise,
the development corporation could profit from the sale
of the project to outside interests, presumably at
retail prices. The call option would not have been
exercised by the investment managers but the development
profits could be captured through the fund's equity
participation. In either scenario the real estate fund
captures the development profit of successful projects.
An interesting sidelight to the securing of future
projects will be the ability to hold product from the
market. An institution with substantial existing
portfolio presence in a certain product type or market
may wish to protect against the deteriorated value of
those assets. Indeed, a well recognized strategy for
sustaining advantage in a fragmented industry supports
the acquisition and closure of important competitors.67
Both the promotion and prevention of specific
product types could be controlled at the direction of
the investment manager. Portfolio diversification
deficiencies could be mitigated through the active
control of developments in process. Institutions will
have satisfied their need for a steady stream of real
estate assets.
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Government regulation has become so strong in New
England and many parts of California that builders will
not be able to start a company on the strength of a
promising project. The up front carrying costs are too
high. Equity funding will give them the ability to
complete difficult projects for the fund.
CALL OPTION CASH FLOWS
Investments in a healthy developer should also be
partially valued as a call option on the yearly
operating earnings of the company. An established
builder's cash flows may be discounted at an appropriate
growth rate and valued separately from the existing
assets. Calpers recognized this value in their purchase
of Sante Fe Pacific. "Through the deal, the pension
fund has gained access to earnings from some of the most
significant real estate development deals in
California.ff68
RISK EVALUATION
An institutional purchase of a real estate developer
will not increase individual, property specific risks.
Moreover, retaining the management structure responsible
for, and most knowledgeable of, the portfolio should
lower systematic risks. The developer will have no
control over the systematic risk associated with the
general real estate economy. However, the developer
will be in the most advantages position to maintain
established relationships with local officials, property
managers and tenants."69
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Advisors cautioned that risks are not technically
lower. The returns are "Preferred returns, not
guaranteed returns. Stock with seats on the board of
directors is not the same as mortgages secured by
assets."7 0 But an advisor discounted the value of a
guaranteed return, "This guarantee is only worth
something if the developer has the money to back it up.
The moneyed partner will essentially be left with all
the risk since he is the only one with any real money in
the deal. The venture can end up as jaunt by the
moneyed partner into the development business."7 1
Portfolios of diversely sponsored 'equity
participations' can suffer from a high degree of
illiquidity. 72 In the long run, the control may provide
better real security.
CONTROL OF PORTFOLIO
one of the greatest values to the institutional
investor may be the ability to exercise substantial
control over management of the real estate portfolio.
Investment managers should look beyond simple market
timing questions of hold and sell periods. Investment
funds may be able to design project size, architectural
and locational characteristics to their exact
specifications. Suboptimal portfolio "fits" of
buildings with undesirable characteristics may be
eliminated.
Again, Calpers recognized this opportunity. "The
California Public Employees Retirement System plans to
39
be an active player in the strategic decisions made by
the real estate company.,7 3 "It's a unique investment.
We do really feel that as a minority partner, along with
the other minority partners, we have a great deal of
influence that can be made on strategy and business
policy of the company." 4 Because of this control,
"Officials expect the investment returns from the fund's
stake in Sante Fe Pacific Realty Corp to be
significantly more than the 5% real return they expect
from the system's average real estate holdings."7 5
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
A further advantage of equity ownership will be
access to information. Real estate funds will gain
access to information directly from the source. By
eliminating the communication barrier between buyer and
seller, the buyer may lower their uncertainty risk
premium. Managers will also gain access to proprietary
market knowledge from local insiders. The local
information also should be more valuable than
traditional advisors sporadic and second hand data. In
addition, localized information sources may be timely
and exhaustive.
MARKET POWER OF DEVELOPERS
The best developers may be able to exhibit market
power and realize better returns for their product. An
analyst commented, "The long term trend toward
consolidation of the development industry will give
additional market power to the surviving large
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developers. The semi efficient real estate market with
many builders and lessors of space will become more
inefficient. Competition will decrease due to increased
barriers and costs of development. Some developers may
corner the market in specialized niches." 76
MANAGEMENT
Institutional investors will gain the advantage of
the most experienced and talented entrepreneurial real
estate professionals in the industry. The equity
purchase will buy "access to top management for the
fund's real estate portfolio."f7 Quality real estate
management that understands asset management, tenant
relations, lease negotiation, and market timing will
have a strong positive effect on terminal real estate
values.
Many private real estate developers who would not
consider salaried employment or consulting positions
with an investment fund will become available. The
first investment funds to acquire or fund the few major
developers in each region will secure the scarce high
quality human capital. Overlapping development company
portfolio acquisitions can be consolidated or merged
under the best management talent of each.
Pension funds valued good management. A portfolio
manager commented, "When the amount of money a fund can
lose through stupid deals and mismanagement of its
property is measured against the annual compensation of
a good real estate man, it appears paltry. The plan
should measure the cost of the man against the amount of
money he can make for them and mot try to get by with
cut-rate real estate people who will work for straight
salaries"78
Furthermore, "Pension officers should compare the
work they put into real estate to the work they did the
last time they hired a new stock or bond manager. They
had to decide on a stock or bond strategy and do asset
allocation analyses. They researched dozens of managers
and intensively interviewed half a dozen or more. After
all, the pension officer is venturing into an investment
frontier for his fund and will want to work as carefully
as possible." 7 9
QUALITY
The advantages of owning a developer will only be
realized through quality purchases. Real estate
investors should look to acquire healthy companies with
intelligent management.80 Real estate fiduciaries should
not follow the lead of "wall street buy outs that have
occurred because of poor management, it is not
applicable to the real estate industry per se." 81
"Quality management may be able to effectively modify
real estate to optimize long term returns and values. 82
Astute asset managers should continuously modify
specific portfolio properties to maintain market
acceptance.
One aspect of real estate risk is the notion of
product obsolescence and enhancement. Although many
financial models of real estate transactions make
assumptions ignoring these risks, obsolescence and
enhancement exist and ultimately affect the residual
value of the asset. If the product maintains its
attractiveness over time, then its value in equilibrium
will be its replacement cost. However, if there is
obsolescence or deterioration, then its value would be
lower than its replacement cost, preventing the residual
value from fully passing through the inflation
increases. Conversely, if the product improves over
time because its site value is enhanced, then its
replacement cost would increase at a rate faster than
that of inflation."83 The purchase of quality assets
with high quality management should be the most
profitable long term investment strategy.
EFFICIENCY
Another advantage of equity control may be increased
efficiency. Internal regional and property type
expertise in development companies should increase the
efficiency of market research for investment fund
managers. Furthermore, portfolios under weighted in one
area can efficiently structure one large developer
portfolio acquisition. Real estate advisors concurred,
"A professional real estate management organization can
help pension funds pursue varying investment strategies
in the inefficient real estate market. Professional
management should be able to weed out overvalued and
inappropriate investments for the pension fund." 8 4
CHAPTER 5
THE VALUE OF EQUITY OWNERSHIP
Establishing the price of an operating real estate
development company involves consideration of items
beyond traditional real estate analysis. Importantly,
investment in an established developer requires
discounted cash flow valuation of the assets. In
addition the investment requires the further valuation
of: the premium for corporate control, the access to
management, and the rights to future projects and cash
flow.
Corporate acquisition valuation does not determine
one, indisputable value. Rather, the process creates a
range of values within which successful negotiations can
take place. Institutions considering an equity
investment in a real estate developer should evaluate,
and then aggregate the company's individual aspects to
ascertain a maximum price.
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The most important and definable aspect of a real
estate developer's worth consists of it's equity
portfolio. Each project's cash flow may be capitalized
to ascertain a discounted net present value.
Institutional investors are familiar with this process.
Analysis should be no different than that of a
traditional building acquisition. Lease terms and
quality, project location, and financial characteristics
all contribute to the capitalization rate and ultimate
asset value.
Some industry professionals believe portfolio
acquisitions provide further value to equity assets.
They believe asset values can be greater in a group if
you can gain market power in a small enough city. 96
Portfolios may also be more valuable in large markets.
A 1990, 20% equity offering of the Reichman Family's
U.S. holdings of class A office space was especially
valuable because of it's substantial market share of
modern, large floor plate buildings in New York City.85
Most development companies may not, however, poses a
large enough portfolio to provide additional value to
their equity portfolio.
CONTROL PREMIUM
Beyond value of portfolio equity, significant value
can be placed on control of a company's daily
operations. Indeed, the holding period risk premium may
be reduced once the 51% threshold of voting rights has
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been achieved. The majority equity holder may influence
the direction of operations toward developments that are
most beneficial for the institutional real estate
portfolio.
To value a control premium, one can look to the
equities markets for insight. Public equity mergers and
acquisitions activity accelerated to record levels
during the late 1980's. Although not specifically
related to real estate, this effort developed financial
models to help value a going concern and it's many
aspects for acquisition.
Milton Rock, in The Mergers and Acquisition
Handbook, explained the difference between technical
asset value and the eventual price paid to control the
company's stock. Rock explained, "Acquisition valuation
is perhaps less theoretical and more concerned with the
real world than discounted cash flow valuation. It is
an attempt to estimate where a company will "trade" in
the market for corporate control."8 6
Rock highlighted the value of controlling equity.
He stated, "The value of a company in the market for
corporate control is higher (and often very much higher)
than its value in the secondary trading market. Why?
Part of the answer is found in the word "control." If
nothing else, control of assets and the ability to
direct all of the free cash flow generated by the assets
are worth more to a business manager than participation
in a small percentage of a business, without control, is
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worth to the individual stockholder." 7 This control may
provide different opportunities to different investors.
Some investors may wish to break apart the assets of the
firm. Some investors may desire the strategic alliance
created by combining firms. Still others may reduce
their losses by keeping the business out of risky
endeavors.
Real estate firms did not demand a high premium for
their control. Investors put little value in a firm's
market presence and good will. The control premium for
the few real estate firms acquired during the late
1980's were substantially below the All Industries
Average.88 This is probably due to the fact that real
estate development is a disaggregated industry with no
dominant national firm.
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Furthermore, no constant price/earnings ratio could
be extrapolated from merger and acquisition activity.
The price/earnings ratio declined dramatically during
the late 1980's. Traditional investment strategy would
conclude that investors devalued future real estate
89
earnings by paying lower earnings multiples
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Another measure of value may be rule of thumb
multiples of book value. Rock explained, "Book value
multiples also are used widely in the financial services
industry, where they function partially as surrogates
for net liquidation value because the assets and
liabilities are carried at values (theoretically at
least) close to market. The multiple of cash flow,
intuitively attractive because of the potential
relationship to discounted cash flow valuation, also can
be very useful."90 Again, the process does not produce
one "correct" value but a range of defensible values.
The following average multiples for 1987 real estate
company acquisitions may be used as rough guides of
value: 91
1987 Multiple Multi of Percent
of Earnings Net Worth of Sales
41.8 2.49 149.2%
The choice of the proper price/earnings multiple may
have a large effect on the terminal value, and care
should be taken to choose a multiple consistent with the
characteristics of both the company and the industry at
that time. For example, one should use low P/E numbers
for companies with stable margins and relatively low
growth rates.92
The control premium for real estate development
companies ranged between a minimum 23% and the industry
average of 40%. Investors discounted the earnings
potential and acquisition multiples for real estate
companies by two thirds over other equity investments.
Institutional real estate investors therefor may be able
to obtain real estate cash flows at relatively
attractive control premiums.
MANAGEMENT
High quality management was valued in all industries
and was especially so in the risky real estate
development field. "It is axiomatic in the real estate
business, on all property, that owners make the best
managers. Anything that improves a property's cash flow
increases a property's value."93 Quantifying this value,
however, may be difficult.
Institutional investors readily employ advisory
consulting firms for strategic planning, acquisitions,
legal, and accounting services. Some estimates may be
extrapolated from the fees charged for these services by
consultants. In addition, advisors provided asset
management and property management services. These
combined fees substantially impacted the overall return
of real estate portfolios. The industry average fees
for direct investment include:
ACQUISITION FEE 1.5% Appraised Value
ASSET MANAGEMENT 1-2% Appraised Value/Year
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 2-3% Gross Receipt per Year
Commingled real estate funds included these costs in
their returns and charged an additional management fee.
One pension fund investment manager commented, "A
commingled fund will generally take a fee off the top of
the return which ranges from about 0.9% to 1.5% of the
asset value in the fund. The average is somewhere
around 1.2%, but this figure is so particular to the
fund that it may not be all that meaningful. As more
investment managers enter the commingled fund business
this fee will certainly drop, but it will have to remain
somewhat representative of true costs incurred."94
A rudimentary addition of the standard management
fees provides a management valuation near 5% of
appraised portfolio value. With leverage, this value
may be much higher as a percentage of equity.
Appropriate deductions should be taken for functions
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performed outside of the real estate development company
such as building maintenance.
Consolidation of the management functions within an
acquired development company may save additional fees.
A large fund believed, "The in house operation is
approximately one third cheaper than an outside advisor.
It is also better."95 After overhead allowances, the
advisory firms were very expensive. On average, one
employee at a large advisory company manages 15
properties valued near $500 million, generating fees of
$2.5 million.9 6 Talented individuals should provide
acquisition and asset management services at a fraction
of customary advisory fees.
The value of superior management may be the most
difficult to determine, and yet the most beneficial.
Talented management may understand the business of real
estate investment to the point that systematic risk is
reduced. Poor investments may be avoided and profitable
investments may be enhanced. Equity investment in an
entrepreneurial real estate developer may be most
beneficial when it allows this access to superior human
capital.
CALL OPTION ON PROJECTS
Another important aspect to value in acquisition
concerns access to future development assets.
Institutions may secure development rights, at an early
stage, for specialized and promising projects. Many
developments have been traditionally sold before
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completion on a cost plus carry basis. However,
institutions may want to consider control of a company
as a call option on future developments projects.
Investors have the opportunity, but not the obligation,
to acquire and hold the property on a wholesale basis
when complete.
A comparison may be drawn with the securities
options market and a value may be estimated with the
Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model.107 The model
translates volatility, time, price, and interest rates
into an estimated value for a stock option. Historic
real estate values may be used in the model to predict
an option value. Model inputs may be estimated as: 97
Real Estate Company Stock Volatility 21.7%
Development Period 7 years
Risk Free Rate 8.0%
Base and Exercise Price 100
The volatility figure is found in publicly traded
real estate companies only. This figure has not been
either proven or disproven to apply to private market
real estate assets. The Black-Scholes Model values the
call option on future projects with a base price of 100
as high as 45%. The model may or may not apply to the
purchase of quality real estate projects. However, the
sizable value placed on future development rights by the
model should not be overlooked.
The real estate industry in general, and
institutional investors in particular, may be
underestimating the value of access to projects at
wholesale prices. At a minimum, the industry has begun
to trade and place great emphasis on the value of
development rights early in the building process.
CALL OPTION ON CASH FLOW
An extension of the call option notion may be to
apply it to future corporate cash flow. Institutional
investors may wish to capture operating cash flow or
profits from development and other related business.
Though discounted cash flow analysis could also value
stable cash flow streams, the option format may be
appropriate. Investors who wish to capitalize the
operations of the company could leave cash flow in the
company. Otherwise, investors could use the cash to pay
dividends on their equity if desirable.
Using a time frame of one year and similar rates as
the call option on future projects 9, the model values
the option at 8% of asset equity value.
The amount of equity investment necessary to acquire
and fund development companies will vary widely.
Developer's historically high leverage implies that a
relatively small amount of equity will be necessary to
acquire their portfolio and expertise. A fund that
desired to invest additional money in a portfolio may
retire the debt associated with each property that is
paid out to other lenders. 99
The timing of the investment return will also vary.
Call options of projects will expire 5 to 7 years from
the initial investment. In contrast, management
expertise should begin to increase portfolio values soon
after the financing. The chart below depicts a typical
investment payback scenario.
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Overall, the science and art of valuation for an
operating real estate developer will require thorough
analysis and strong judgement. The valuation of 'soft'
items such as control and management value may be
anathema to real estate managers comfortable with simple
discounted cash flow analysis. However, real value and
risk reduction may be found beyond the assets. Equities
market investors relied on this trend to increase non
real estate stock values during the 1980's.
Institutional real estate managers may be able to
capture this additional value through strong negotiation
and shrewd analysis.
CHAPTER 6
THE CANDIDATES FOR EQUITY OWNERSHIP
Successfully capturing value in a developer's equity
will require the evaluation of real estate markets, the
development industries and the developers in them. Real
estate segments should be investigated in both regional
markets and product types. Promising industry segments
will contain an array of development companies with
distinct reputation, quality, and financial traits.
Differences in individual portfolio characteristics will
further distinguish possible candidates by type, size,
and location.
REGIONAL DIVERSIFICATION
DECISION TREE
INSTITUTIONAL PORTFOLIO NEEDS
Institutions should first analyze their internal
needs and goals to create a fully diversified portfolio.
Strategies for regional diversification, investment
vehicles and management criteria may influence
acquisition selections. A pension fund manager believed
the process should be handled directly. "Private
portfolio investing is the ideal route for pension fund
real estate investors who have enough capital to create
an adequately diversified portfolio and to sustain the
associated operating expenses. Since successful real
estate investors frequently express their experienced
based belief that control is the most critical
investment element, the private portfolio investing
route seems to be the most sensible strategy for large
pension funds in particular."100
REGIONAL DIVERSIFICATION
Sophisticated real estate investors have divided the
United States into numerous segments in order to best
understand the nature of local markets. The eight
nations of the North America was an attempt to tie real
estate trends to the underlying nature of the regional
economy.101 Other works divided North America into
further economic segments. These or similar regional
diversification strategies should already be in effect
in most institutional portfolios.
Investors should not plan to move the developer's
management. A successful regional developer strategized
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on this point. "The valuable relationship skills of a
regional developer are not transferable to other regions
and that the National developers strategy to operate in
many markets will produce suboptimal returns."1 02
A further breakdown of regions from U.S. Census
data into SMSA's (Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Areas) may be the most appropriate measure to look at
development presence. Of the thousands of SMSA's, 27
major markets are of appropriate size and health to
support an active real estate development industry.103
These 27 markets may be balanced within an investment
portfolio as a first step toward market diversification.
NUMBER OF INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
Within each market, five to ten reputable,
established, development companies will dominate the
real estate business. When this notion is extrapolated
to the 27 SMSA's, a range of 150 to 300 companies
becomes available. Of that array, many builders will
overlap regions and product types. Although size is not
a measure of portfolio management excellence, most of
the "top 100" developers in any category should be
considered possible acquisition targets.
A salient point lies in the fact that these top 100
developers represent only 14% of the sizable existing
development companies. In 1990 there were 737 real
estate development and related businesses in the United
States with yearly revenues over $1 million.10 4  In
addition, there were thousands of firms with lesser
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earnings.
As the development community consolidates, various
large development companies will dominate in each major
metropolitan area. Investors should pursue these firms.
If the region is small enough, the major developers will
be able to increase their yields through decreased
competition and market power. The most influential
development firms may be powerful in more than one
market in each product type. These firms should capture
the majority of the region's development potential and
investor's attention.
THE INDUSTRY
Institutional investors should also look for
industries and development types with barriers to
competition. Each developer's industry and product type
may have different entry premiums and barriers to
competition. The most promising companies will be in
market segments with strategic advantages that are
difficult to duplicate. High permitting costs,
grandfathered government permits, and development rights
for one of a kind projects may be items that preclude
competition.
COMPETITION Analysis of corporate competitors is
critical for successful equity investments. One fund
manager theorized, "Competition from other developers
should also be evaluated on a portfolio wide basis.
Will a large equity funding allow them to enter the
market with previously unbuildable product? Will the
developer not find financing and sell their portfolio
into the market?"105
A developer continued, "Real estate development is
not a business of fairness. Small developers simply
will not be able to compete with the larger, more
politically connected players. Those relationships are
invaluable in terms of getting a project through the
permitting, construction and lease up phases. There is
at least a 10-15% cost savings from strong
relationships. Every time schedule in the process can
be accelerated or at least managed effectively." 106
Investors will also have to control the competitive
instincts of the top management in the firm they
acquire. An investor managed this risk with the
structure of their investment. "They "captivated" the
developer with certain exclusionist provisions that
ensure that the developer would not create another
company to compete with this one now that the developer
has recapitalized his existing activities." 107
For development company investors, competitive
analysis should go far beyond traditional discounted
cash flow analysis and may be the key to profitable
developer acquisitions.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
Investors should also look for developers who may be
stifled by local government. The difficult regulatory
environments and the cost of land has increased start up
costs for projects. Permitting and development times
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have increased, some projects now take seven to ten
years to implement.1 08
In one example, "Prudential Insurance Company
complained that city regulations and special interest
groups meant it could take hundreds of thousands of
dollars and five years or more just to find out how you
can develop your property. Consider an independent
developer stuck in the midst of such municipal
deliberations. The expense on his high priced
construction money adds up. That extra two years of
waiting for city approval is more than enough to drive
him into lethal cost overruns that kill the deal before
it has a chance at life." 109
Indeed, European funds have pursued regulated
investment environments to the fullest. "In Great
Britain, insurance companies and pension funds dominate
the real estate business because years of tight
government control of development have driven everyone
else out of the business. Institutions, particularly
pension funds, are the only ones with any money to lend,
and they do not lend, they buy property and hold onto it
forever."110 Investors who see this trend beginning in
the U.S. should look to use it to their full advantage.
Development companies that can withstand regulatory
pressures should ultimately create substantial value.
THE DEVELOPER
Upon selection of desirable regions and markets
segments, the investor must ascertain the best developer
60
in each to fill the portfolio's requirements. An
advisor commented, "It seems inherently easier for a
local company to evaluate real estate assets that it is
for a national or non local pension fund since the value
of these assets is so particular to the local market. I
suspect that this would be true on any size project, but
especially on smaller ones."" Pension funds and
Insurance companies pursuing this trend have gravitated
toward the "splashier names in the development industry.
These names were easier to sell to their investment
committees." 112 To date, the famous name has provided
the investor a de facto screening mechanism and a
comfort level about general professionalism.
To further screen a company, "Look closely at
management's ability, reputation, and standing in its
industry. Management's track record and its actual
performance against business plans should be assessed,
along with their historical ability to manage during
adverse market conditions. Be assured that management
has a clear sense of direction and is capable of
achieving its goals."113 In addition, institutions
should screen numerous other skills. The developer
should have: knowledge of the city and it's regulatory
systems; strong contractor and tenant relations; and
cultural and political sensitivity.
The aggregation and institutionalization of the real
estate development industry will continue. A respected
developer commented, "I can't see how most of the
development companies will compete in the future."114
Undercapitalized development companies will be forced to
find an investment partner or go out of business.
Pressure will be put on medium sized developers who do
not dominate a specific market or product niche. This
may spur movement toward three tiers of development
organizations. 115 The three tiers may include:
The National Developer - Financed by major pension
funds, they will operate in all markets through national
headquarters and act as a conduit for projects developed
for the fund's portfolio. These could be national
advisory umbrellas that provide efficient market
analysis and financial aid to regional offices.
The Regional Developer - Also financed by pension
funds and insurance companies, Regional developers will
surface with the power to impact local markets. The
developers will provide product for investment to
different funds who want to invest in that market on a
project specific basis.
The Boutique Developer - Financed by personal or
corporate equity, Boutique developers will emerge to
provide specialized product types and infill commercial
sites under 20,000 S.F. that the National and Regional
developers bypass.
of this group, the best equity purchases will be of
companies that clearly define their role within the
future development spectrum.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
From the previous discussion, one can draw a number
of conclusions:
- The assets of pension funds continue to grow, and
institutional investors desire profitable locations for
their real estate portfolio allocations.
- The sources of real estate investment capital have
declined, and developers are searching for liquidity to
finance their ongoing operations.
- Equity ownership of real estate development
companies is a workable solution for institutional
investment and developer financing needs.
- To accomplish their goals, pension funds, and other
large, patient investors should purchase the stock or
hybrid debt of real estate development companies.
- The equity control of development firms will provide
numerous strategic advantages, significant value
enhancement, and risk reduciton to investors.
- The value of acquiring and controlling an operating
development company is significantly higher than the
discounted cash flow valuation of it's properties.
- The strongest real estate development companies in
each market and in each product type are good candidates
for portfolio diversification through equity investment.
- Institutions have substantial negotiation strength
over illiquid development companies.
Consequently, institutions should guard against
imposing undue restrictions on the development firms
they acquire. Long time real estate managers feel the
"need to keep the entrepreneurial spirit in real estate
management is critical for the best results." 116 Yet the
environment is ripe for developer investment overtures.
An experienced investment manager predicted strong
negotiation leverage for institutional investors, 11
"Just about the only owners capable of holding
out a good chunk of ownership from the
predations of the institutional lender are
those developers who have such expertise in
developing a particular type of income property
that they are indispensable. Unless they put
the deal together, there will be no deal for an
investor to buy. In the end, these developers
have the best leverage of any developer or
individual owner. Because some developers are
more indispensable than others.
But as money becomes scarce, so do the
clever deals. Income property financing is
less a negotiation between eguals than the
granting of a favor by those with money - the
institutions - to those without it - the
property owners. Even indispensable developers
can become dispensable if they need cash badly
enough. Unless present owners have the
resources to wait until institutions tire of
this position, the owner must give them what
they want. Where else can he go?
An advisor concurred, "We have seen a lot of
opportunities to do this recently and there are
substantial benefits for investors and developers."118
Clearly, development company equity provides strong
institutional investment opportunity.
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